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I. Introduction 
 
1. This paper was commissioned by the Trade and Markets Division of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to address the relationship between food aid 
and commercial international food trade as background to an anticipated OECD study on the 
export competition aspects of food aid.  The terms of reference for this study call for “a critical 
review of the existing literature on the potential use of food aid as an export support policy or, 
alternatively, the potential that food aid bears implications similar to those of export supporting 
policies.”    
 
2. This paper can be summarized as follows.  Food aid has multiple objectives, modalities 
and effects and there has been significant movement over time in each of these areas.  Concerns 
about the use of food aid as an export support policy are founded in both the history of bilateral 
food aid, in the political economy of food aid support in major donor countries, and in some 
current uses. The effects of food aid on commercial international food trade turn on several key 
factors, chief among which is its targeting, of which timing of deliveries is an important subfactor. 
Due to inevitably imperfect targeting at both macro and micro levels, food aid clearly displaces 
commercial sales of food contemporaneously in recipient economies.  The evidence is unclear as 
to the distribution of these short-term losses across domestic and foreign suppliers in recipient 
countries, but the evidence somewhat favors the conclusion that most of the displacement comes 
out of commercial imports.  Whether this displacement adversely effects international food 
markets depends on the manner in which the food aid is obtained, how well integrated the 
recipient economy market is with the global market, and recipient demand for variety. The 
longer-term effects of food aid turn on the dynamic income effects of food aid receipt and the 
extent to which these stimulate future food demand. The crucial questions then are how the short-
term losses due to contemporaneous displacement of commercial imports, the global market 
effects of alternative food aid procurement modalities, and the long-term gains from any 
derivative income stimulus balance out over time and how these costs and benefits are distributed 
among donors and third party exporters.  Research on these topics has been surprisingly scarce 
and, largely as a consequence, premature conclusions are too often drawn on the basis of quite 
limited evidence on the contemporaneous displacement effects of food aid on recipient country 
markets.  Finally, because food aid’s effects on trade stem directly from the efficacy of targeting, 
policymakers exploring the effects of food aid on commercial international food trade must 
consider explicitly the trade-off between higher expected displacement of commercial trade and 
higher expected targeting errors of exclusion of intended beneficiaries through restrictive 
distribution rules. 
 
 
II. Historical and Institutional Background1 
 
3. When the United States Congress passed the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act (Public Law 83-480) in July 1954, the modern era of food began.2,3  As is 
                                                 
1 This section draws heavily on Barrett (forthcoming). 
2 Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 also provided for overseas commodity donations of surplus 
commodity by the Commodity Credit Corporation administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. It 
has remained an active facility for United States food aid, although section 416(b) shipments vary 
considerably in response to changing surplus volumes and have been swamped by PL480 over time.  There 
has been a sharp increase again in 416(b) shipments since late 1998, much of it tied to the launch of the 
global food for education initiative in July 2000 (Hanrahan 2002).  
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suggested in the title of the act, known ever after as PL 480 or the Food for Peace program, food 
aid was not originally envisioned as an entirely humanitarian program.  Rather, it was a part of 
American agricultural and foreign policy through which the United States shared its farm 
surpluses with food-deficit countries around the world.  As such, there were several stated goals 
in the original act: disposal of surpluses generated by domestic farm support programs, and 
promotion of international demand for agricultural exports from the United States.  Relative 
emphasis among goals has shifted over time in response to changing domestic and global 
conditions, but the multi-purpose approach to food aid persists (Hopkins 1984, Ruttan 1993, 
Ruttan 1995, Ball and Johnson 1996, Christensen 2000, Clay and Stokke 2000).   
 
4. Multiple objectives beget multiple forms of food aid shipments.  Food aid is commonly 
divided into three categories: program, project, or emergency (humanitarian).  Program aid is 
generally an untargeted distribution sold on recipient country markets to raise general local 
currency revenue (“counterpart funds”) used to support recipient country development 
interventions approved by the donor.  Project food aid, by contrast, is targeted at clearly defined 
beneficiary groups within the recipient country, often through supplementary feeding programs or 
food-for-work schemes.  Humanitarian or emergency assistance is directed at unanticipated man-
made and natural disasters, and is thus commonly used for supplementary feeding programs for 
refugees and internally displaced persons.  The latter two types of food aid are almost always 
completely free and are commonly distributed through private voluntary organizations (PVOs). 
Historically, half to three-quarters of the total value of all food aid has been distributed for free, 
and the proportion has been rising steadily as humanitarian shipments have grown as a proportion 
of total food aid flows.   
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       Figure 1,Data Source: World Food Programme (2001) 
 
5. Program food aid has traditionally swamped the other two forms, although the 1990s 
brought a dramatic transition, with program food aid flows falling sharply with the reduction in 
donor country farm programs and resulting food surpluses for concessional distribution.  In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, global program food aid flows averaged about 7.5 million metric tons 
annually (Figure 1).  By contrast, leaving out the aberration year of 1999,4 global program food 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Canada’s modern food aid program began in 1951 and thus predates the American program slightly.  But 
the Canadian program has always been considerably smaller than its southern cousin.  See Charlton (1992) 
for details. 
4 There were a few temporary program food aid increases in 1999, of which the most significant by far 
were massive United States flows to Russia, making it temporarily the world’s largest food aid recipient. 
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aid averaged only about 2.5 million metric tons annually, 1996-2000 (Figure 1).5  Title I  PL 480 
flows from the United States have historically accounted for the overwhelming majority of 
program food aid flows.  Title I PL 480 provides concessional credits products to recipient 
country governments, with the credit tied to the imports of farm products from the United States.  
Program food aid is marketed through existing commercial channels, leading to significant 
opportunities for displacement.  Displacement of commercially supplied food is especially likely 
in recipient country markets because recipient governments monetize most or all the shipments 
on arrival to raise funds for domestic programs, which may or may not be food-related.   In 
essence, program food aid is foreign aid distributed in the form of food.  It was born of domestic 
farm support programs that generated surpluses in need of disposal so that food was a relatively 
cheap medium in which to provide export subsidies and foreign assistance to friendly 
governments.     
 
6. Times have changed, however.  In the past few years, humanitarian aid shipments have 
become the largest single source of flows, up sharply from the 10-15% average pre-1990 (figure 
1). While shipments under Titles I and III of PL 480 (operated by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture) have fallen sharply, shipments under Title II PL 480 (operated by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development) exhibit a largely stable trend, albeit with considerable volatility.  
Title II PL 480 is food donated for humanitarian purposes, such as disaster relief, and for targeted 
projects such as food-for-work schemes, school feeding programs, etc. However, although 
emergency food aid such as Title II PL 480 has historically been much more carefully targeted at 
food distribution to needy individuals, it has gradually come to look more like program food aid 
because an increasing proportion of humanitarian food aid is monetized (i.e., sold on the open 
market by the receiving agency to raise cash for operations, akin to counterpart funds raised by 
governments receiving program food aid).  The minimum monetization level has increased to 
15% on nonemergency Title II PL480 flows and many agencies monetize considerably greater 
proportions as food aid has become a primary source of resources for many PVOs (Barrett et al. 
forthcoming).  
 
7. The rise of humanitarian food aid has gone hand-in-hand with the rise of multilateral 
distribution over the past quarter century. The United Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP), 
established in 1963, has accounted for a rapidly increasing share of world food aid flows since the 
World Food Conference of 1974.  In 2000, multilateral food aid flows (of which WFP comprises 
99%) accounted for 38 percent of global deliveries, larger than the 34 percent distributed through 
bilateral channels or the 28 percent distributed through PVOs (WFP 2001). In large measure, the 
rapid growth of the WFP reflects the (partial) disengagement of food aid from (declining) 
surpluses generated by donor country farm programs.  More than half the WFP’s budget now 
comes from cash contributions, giving it greater flexibility in delivery modalities than many 
bilateral donors.  As Charlton (1992, p.46) notes, “although the WFP has frequently not received 
much publicity, it has emerged as the second largest source [globally] of development funds after 
the World Bank.” 
 
8. Because the WFP, as an international organization, has no other diplomatic agenda, no 
farm surpluses to liquidate and no food exporters to promote, its rise has led to greater focus on 
                                                 
5 Shaw and Singer (1996) raise insightful questions about official statistics on food aid flows, suggesting 
that considerable undercounting takes place.  While I echo their concerns about the quality of the available 
data, attempting any correction for errors in extant food aid data lies well outside the scope of this brief 
review.  All figures reported or used here rely on data publicly available from the FAO, the WFP, or USDA. 
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the food security promotion objective of food aid.6 The WFP has consequently pushed the use of 
local purchases and triangular transactions as innovative means of sourcing distributed food.7  In 
2000, 11 percent of food aid was procured in developing countries (WFP 2001).  EU food aid 
programs have likewise sharply expanded the use of local purchases and triangular transactions, 
from 16 percent of total shipments in 1989-91 to 24 percent in 1992-94, with countries like 
Ireland, the Netherlands, and the U.K. now using these modalities for most of their food aid 
donations (Clay et al. 1996).  The WFP’s greater attention to recipient country food security is 
manifest in a record of food aid shipments that have proved considerably more responsive to 
fluctuations in recipient country nonconcessional food availability – defined as domestic 
production plus commercial imports – than have PL 480 flows from the United States (Barrett 
2001a, Barrett and Heisey 2001).  
 
9. Along with the shift in emphases, sources and delivery modalities has come an 
adjustment in the geography of food aid. Where the primary beneficiaries were in Europe and east 
Asia in the 1950s, India and south Asia in the 1960s, sub-Saharan Africa received the largest 
share of international food aid in the early 1990s.  However, Africa’s share and that of Latin 
America and the Caribbean declined sharply over the course of the 1990s as shipments to Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union became substantial (Figure 2). Low-income economies 
generally have received an increasing proportion of food aid flows over the past twenty years.   
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Figure 2, Data source: World Food Programme (2001) 
                                                 
6 This is consistent with the more general finding that recipient need tends to play a larger role in 
multilateral assistance, while donor self-interest plays a relatively large role in bilateral assistance (Maizels 
and Nissanke 1984, Ruttan 1995). 
7 Local purchase schemes use donated funds to purchase food in surplus areas of the recipient country for 
distribution in deficit areas.  This helps stimulate local production while circumventing market 
impediments — often weaknesses in the marketing infrastructure, sometimes simply insufficient 
purchasing power in deficit regions — that impede the free domestic flow of foodstuffs in the recipient 
country and saving on ocean transport costs.  For example, there has been a sharp increase in donor 
procurement of food on the Ethiopian domestic market for distribution within that country, the largest food 
aid recipient in Africa (Amha et al. 1997). Triangular transactions work the same way, except that foods are 
purchased or traded for in a country other than the recipient or donor countries.  Triangular transactions are 
commonly used when a national-level shock (e.g., drought, floods, or cyclones) that destroyed much of a 
nation’s crop did not affect a neighboring country’s harvest. 
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10. The changing geography of food aid applies on the donor end as well as the recipient side.  
Where the U.S. accounted for more than 90 percent of global food aid flows every year from 
1955-70, due to its unparalleled food surpluses and global political interests, the EU and the WFP 
now account for almost half of all food aid flows.  The changing sources and uses of food aid 
reveal how the emphasis of food aid distribution has shifted from Cold War and trade promotion 
objectives to humanitarian ones for which the Europeans especially are champions.8 
 
11. On balance, food aid flows have fallen sharply over the past decade, from a high of 15 
million metric tons9 in 1992-93 to less than 7 million metric tons only four years later, before 
stabilizing and rec y 2000 (WFP 2001, Figure 2). 
The United States , from 8.5 million metric tons 
to less than three million tons by 1996-97 before recovering a bit to around five million metric 
tons each of the past four years.    
 
12. Food aid accounts for a small and declining share of cross-border food flows and an even 
smaller share of total food availability.  From the late 1950s through the mid-1960s, food aid 
from the United States accounted for at least one quarter and sometimes greater than one half of 
U.S. agr  relative terms to only ten 
 
 
overing to around 11 million metric tons again b
has cut its food aid donations especially sharply
icultural exports. By the early 1970s, food aid had fallen in
percent of world cereal trade, then down further to about five percent in the early 1990s, and just 
three percent in 2000 (Figure 3). This pattern holds true even among low-income, food deficit
countries, who now receive food aid worth less than ten percent of their commercial food imports, 
according to FAO data.  Food aid represents only about 0.3 percent of total food availability 
(Figure 3) and has accounted for as much as ten percent of total food available in a recipient 
economy in less than ten percent of country-years (Barrett 2001a). 
 
       Figure 3, Data source: FAO 
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8 The increased prominence of European donors and widespread concern for vulnerable subpopulations in 
the transition eco ies of eastern and central Europe and the former Soviet Union has triggered 
substantial food a ows to those regions in the 1990s (Figure 1), some of which appear to have been 
additional to and e of which seem to have been diverted from low-income count  and 
Benson and Clay 8). 
9 All figures are in eat equivalents unless indicated otherwise. 
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13. Food aid remains important in a few commodities, however, such as wheat and soybean 
oil. By weight, cereals comprise the vast majority of food aid, at least 90 percent most years.  
heat and wheat flour are the principal commodities, although massive dairy surpluses in the 
U.S. and  significant dairy shipments.  The same has been the 
ase for vegetable oils from the U.S.  Generally, the commodity composition of donor countries’ 
 
gun to 
r 
 1993 Denmark reduced 
s use of more expensive, processed animal products to less expensive basic vegetable 
mo
t 
lows from the United States in the past few 
ears (Hanrahan 2002). In late 1998, the U.S. Congress approved a 3.1 million metric ton food 
d 
ct, 
ments. Under Article 
0 of the URAA, World Trade Organisation (WTO) member countries that are international food 
 
ut in 
rinciples 
W
 the EU have occasionally sparked
c
food aid reflects those items currently in surplus in the donor economy.  As a consequence, while
food aid represents a small share of total agricultural exports from donors, there are a few 
commodities (notably U.S. soybean oil and EU skimmed milk powder in the 1990s) for which 
food aid accounts for half or more of all shipments overseas.  With the rapid increase in 
humanitarian food aid flows and the reduction of program aid flows, there has been a parallel 
expansion in noncereals food aid, notably “blended foods” — usually cereals fortified with milk 
powder and micronutrients for use in supplementary feeding programs. 
 
14. Along with the other shifts, so too has the commodity composition of food aid be
adjust.  Denmark and a few other, smaller European donors have made significant shifts in thei
food aid strategies, away from domestic farm support and export promotion and in favor of 
attending to recipient nutritional needs at minimum cost. For example, in
it
com dities, thereby enabling  Danish contributions to the World Food Programme to provide 
six times more calories and three times more protein than the 1990 Danish food aid basket, and a
lower cost (Colding and Pinstrup-Andersen 1999). 
 
15. The many changes notwithstanding, export market development remains an important 
political justification for food aid, especially in the United States.  PL 480 Titles I and III still 
comprise a major share (about 20%) of global food aid flows, and there has been significant 
resurgence in use of 416(b) and Food for Progress f
y
aid program for Russia.  This exceeded the sum of all US food aid shipments just two years 
earlier and underscores the continued use of food aid for export promotion purposes. The Unite
States’ 1996 farm bill, known as the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) A
identified food aid as one of four programs to be used in support of commercial agricultural 
exports.  It is plain that the trade promotion objective of food aid persists.  
 
16. Since export subsidies have been and continue to be reduced under the disciplines of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), signed at Marrakesh. Morocco, in April 
1994, but food aid programs are not subject to the same restrictions, there is reason to worry 
about the use of food aid as a means to circumvent trade liberalization agree
1
aid donors are prohibited from tying food aid directly or indirectly to commercial exports of 
agricultural products to recipient countries. This restriction was intended to prevent the 
circumvention of the export subsidy commitments made under the URAA.  The URAA also 
stipulates that food aid is to be given in fully grant form to the maximum extent possible, or on 
terms no less concessional than those provided for in Article IV of the 1986 Food Aid Convention
(FAC). Furthermore, all food aid transactions (including bilateral food aid) are to be carried o
accordance with the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations’ (FAO) “P
of Surplus Disposal and Consultative Obligations,” including the system of Usual Marketing 
Requirements (UMR). UMRs aim to minimize the harmful impact of food aid shipments on 
commercial trade and agricultural production.10 This is intended to prevent exporting countries 
from supplying food aid to markets that would otherwise be commercial (non-food-aid) markets 
                                                 
10 Adherence to UMRs is monitored and “enforced” by the FAO’s Committee on Surplus Disposal (CSD). 
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and thereby disrupt international commodity flows and prices. Recipients are thus obliged to 
maintain a certain minimum level of  commercial imports under the FAC. A new, three-year FA
came into force on July 1, 1999, wherein donors agreed to donate to developing countries certain 
minimum food aid donation volumes (or the cash equivalent) as specified below (FAO, 1999)
with at least 80% of the donation on a fully grant basis. 
 
17. The FAO (1995) estimated that the increase in world market prices as a result of the 
URAA would be around 7% for wheat, 7% for rice, 4% f
C 
, 
or maize and 4% for millet/sorghum, 
nd other model-based estimates similarly anticipated increased world food prices (Konandreas et 
hly 
eno 
onor concerns such as surplus disposal and trade promotion, some of which pay 
reater attention to recipient concerns for a stable source of sufficient food to supply 
aid 
 food flows 
lationship 
a
al. 2000). The resulting increase in export revenues from these cereals were estimated to roug
equal the income transfer to food importers through food aid.  The low-income food-deficit 
countries worried openly throughout the Uruguay Round and thereafter that post-URAA food aid 
volumes would prove insufficient to compensate for the higher market prices they would face, 
thereby putting still greater food insecurity pressures on their economies (Ballenger Mabbs-Z
1992, Shaw and Singer 1996, Konandreas et al. 2000). The food aid provisions of the URAA 
didn't indicate either the levels at which food aid should continue to be provided or whether it 
should go beyond existing needs to improve the nutritional levels in developing countries.  These 
commitments have traditionally been made under the FAC, but did not increase with the 1999 
agreement. 
 
18. Food aid is thus a complex set of different facilities and donors, some of which are more 
focused on d
g
impoverished populations.  Furthermore, the objectives, modalities and geography of food aid 
have shifted considerably over time.  Of most immediate concern in this paper, although food 
continues to account for only a very small fraction of food availability or cross-border
globally, it continues to be motivated in part by export promotion objectives and may affect 
international food trade at the margin.  The next section provides a conceptual review of these 
issues before section IV’s review of the limited empirical evidence on the relationship between 
food aid and commercial international food trade. 
 
 
III. Theory and Issues of the Food Aid-Trade Re  
9. Differences in climate, technology and the availability of land and water create sharp 
lance, the world today enjoys 
ignificant and growing food surpluses.  These surpluses are concentrated in a relatively small 
ber
d 
nd 
 
20. Since the objective of food aid is to mitigate the failure of the commercial food 
distribution system to ensure adequate food access for all, the central questions about food aid’s 
 
1
differences in agricultural productivity around the globe.  On ba
s
num  of countries, especially in North America, Europe, Australia and the southern cone 
countries of South America.  Most commercial food trade takes place among these countries an
the large economies that do not enjoy large domestic food surpluses, such as China, Japan and 
Russia.  Food trade has grown quite rapidly over the past generation as increasing incomes a
falling costs of commerce have stimulated faster expansion in trade than in output.  Nonetheless, 
a large share of the world’s population continues to suffer food insecurity or hunger and many 
low-income countries have insufficient food available to provide nutritionally adequate diets for
all their citizens even if food were evenly distributed throughout the population.  Food aid is thus 
intended to address the commercial food distribution problem that leaves 800 million or more 
people hungry in a world enjoying food surpluses.     
 
effects on global food markets revolve around targeting.  Were food aid to flow exclusively to 
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those who would otherwise go hungry, and only in amounts and forms such that those needy 
recipients did not correspondingly reduce their own production or commercial purchase of food, 
then food aid would be wholly additional. The term “additionality” is thus central to discussions 
e food 
 
ce suggests that the 
arginal propensity to consume food is somewhat higher when the additional income is received 
oming).  
 
 
e 
s 
 effects on third country exporters.  Beyond the first question of additionality, 
owever, there has been scant empirical research.  As a consequence, it remains difficult to make 
scie
ects, 
vidence in section IV. 
ciated 
 is 
ly 
isplacement turns largely on the efficacy of food aid distribution in targeting the poor.  Because 
me 
od 
e 
 
 
e 
of food aid efficacy, for one key objective of food aid is to add as much as possible to th
consumption of the poor.  This is entirely consistent with the UMR requirement under the FAC, 
although the UMR exists primarily to defend commercial trade markets.  
 
21. The FAC definition of UMRs nonetheless ignores one of the most basic laws of 
consumer behavior, Engel’s law, which states that food is a normal good characterized by an 
income elasticity of demand less than one.  So each dollar of added income received, whether by
an individual or a collection of individuals (e.g., a recipient country) almost inevitably generates 
less than a dollar’s additional consumption of food.  The empirical eviden
m
in the form of food, rather than as cash, but Engel’s Law holds nonetheless (Barrett forthc
Key questions as to food aid’s short-term effects on commercially sourced food in recipient 
country markets thus include (i) what affects the degree of additionality of food aid? and (ii) what
commercial sources are displaced by food aid and by how much?  Most of the empirical work on 
the relationship between food aid and trade have focused entirely on these questions, as section
IV reviews. 
 
22. The question of additionality is a purely short-run concern, however, and not even th
only factor influencing the short-run effects of food aid on international food trade.  The 
remainder of this section enumerates the various factors that condition food aid’s inherently 
ambiguous short- and long-run effects on commercial food trade, both exports by food aid donor
and spillover
h
any ntifically sound statements as to how food aid affects trade. 
 
23. First we consider the effects of food aid on recipient behavior before we turn to 
considering the effects of donor sourcing and the nature of international markets.  One can 
usefully four distinct effects of food aid on recipient country food markets: static income eff
dynamic income effects, demand for variety, and dynamic domestic producer response.  We 
address the concepts of each in turn here, then present the empirical e
 
24. The most obvious consequence of food aid receipt is the static income effect asso
with the transfer of resources in the form of food, for which the income elasticity of demand
less than one.  The increase in local food supply from food aid shipments necessarily exceeds the 
induced increase in food demand, resulting in less than one-for-one additionality and inevitab
some contemporaneous displacement of commercial food purchases.  The magnitude of the 
d
inco elasticities of demand fall sharply as one approaches and moves beyond the poverty line 
(Strauss and Thomas 1995, Deaton 1997, Barrett forthcoming), additionality is highest when fo
aid reaches almost exclusively intended poor beneficiaries.  Leakage to unintended recipients of 
better means necessarily increases the contemporary market displacement effects of food aid. 
Because effective targeting is costly, leakage is inevitable.  While there has been considerabl
improvement in targeting methods over the past decade or two, it remains extremely difficult, 
both politically and administratively, to concentrate food aid distribution on just the poor (Barrett
forthcoming).  Timing is an important dimension of targeting. If food aid is meant to respond to 
short-term, adverse shocks in recipient nonconcessional food availability, donors need to identify
emerging needs early and deliver the food quickly. The difficulties of targeting across both tim
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and recipients give rise to diminished additionality.  We review the empirical evidence on food
aid targeting efficacy in section IV. 
 
25. The magnitude of contemporaneous displacement is not the only issue. Displaced 
commercial sales could be taken from donor country exporters, third country exporters or 
domestic producers.  In so far as displacement of donor country exports is not of great concern –
this effectively constitutes a relabelli
 
 
ng of the flow11 – the issue revolves around the extent to 
hich food aid displaces third country exports or domestic production.  A longstanding literature 
arized 
al 
l 
 of 
ceived by the recipient comes in the form of food.  But there may be important dynamic 
come multiplier effects.  Food aid may improve recipient nutrition, thereby creating human 
ous 
 
 of 
 
r-
elihood grows that the market for the donated commodity 
ecomes sated – thereby displacing commercial sales of that commodity in that place at that time 
 
e 
 
ts 
                                                
w
in development economics, dating from Schultz (1960) and Fisher (1963) and nicely summ
by Maxwell and Singer (1979), explores the possible adverse effects of food aid flows on 
recipient country farmers.  As presented by Mohapatra et al. (1999) in an analytical general 
equilibrium model, the issue turns on how factor market effects on purchased (especially 
imported) inputs, capital and labor balance out against product market effects about which earlier, 
partial equilibrium analyses worried extensively.  The outcome is analytically ambiguous; 
recipient country farmers could either benefit or lose from food aid shipments into their loc
market.  
 
26. The concern within the OECD and WTO tends to revolve not only around displacement 
of recipient country produce but also around induced reductions in third country commercia
exports. The contemporaneous displacement effect results entirely because the extra increment
income re
in
capital and improving physical and cognitive performance.  Food aid may also provide scarce 
working capital for productive investments, precisely because it displaces some contemporane
food purchases, thereby relieving the recipient’s budget constraint.  No matter the channel, there 
is good reason to hypothesize that food aid can have dynamic income multiplier effects among 
recipients.  In that case, induced increases to future income should stimulate future demand for
food.  The combination of short-term displacement of commercial food purchases and stimulus
long-term (demand for and thus) purchases of food prompted Barrett (1998) and Barrett et al. 
(1999) to hypothesize the existence of a J-curve effect of food aid on commercial food imports by
recipients.  The hypothesis holds that commercial purchases initially fall due to less than one-fo
one additionality, but that they then recover and ultimately surpass the ex ante level due to 
dynamic income multiplier effects.  If food aid also helps to shape consumer preferences for the 
imported foodstuff instead of indigenous foods, this could further reinforce the dynamic trade 
gains resulting from food aid. 
 
27. Just as aggregation across time can prove misleading, so can aggregation across 
commodities.  The demand for dietary variety has been well-documented (Berhman and 
Deolalikar 1989).  When food aid is quite concentrated in just a few commodities, as is true in 
most food aid programs, the lik
b
– but also that this stimulates additional demand in markets for different foods, especially
luxuries such as processed foods, meats, fresh fruits and vegetables, and other higher-valu
products.  The aggregate effects on food trade may therefore mask qualitatively different effects
across commodities – and therefore producer groups – due to the demand for variety and i
effects on expenditures out of marginal income received in the form of a particular commodity.  
 
 
11 There is also a likely increase in the total cost of delivered food due to the more complex distribution, but 
that issue is outside the scope of the present review. 
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28. The consequences of food aid for food trade depend not only on recipient behavior but 
also on donor and broader market behavior.  In particular, it matters whether food aid is sourc
from cash appropriations used to make de novo purchases on the open market, or from 
ed 
overnment-owned stocks of surplus commodities, and it matters how well integrated recipient 
g 
perfect competition.  Rather, the food aid supply curve is really a policy reaction 
nction reflecting donors’ preferences for (supplying) food aid and the opportunity cost of the 
 nature 
o 
rement of food necessarily shifts out the aggregate 
emand curve for food on the source market(s), thereby driving up local prices and benefiting 
me r 
 it is 
se 
s 
iscrimination, charging one price (the world market 
rice) to commercial buyers with a higher willingness to pay and another, lower price (often zero) 
   
ed 
ld be if 
es 
ume that the surplus stocks would otherwise be 
                                                
g
and source markets are with other food markets worldwide.  We close this section by considerin
these issues. 
 
29. As Gilbert (1996) points out, food aid supply curves are unlike the supply curves 
economists derive from the theory of the firm, based on the quantity summation of marginal cost 
curves under 
fu
food given.  As a consequence, the market effects of food aid depend fundamentally on the
of food aid procurement. Until the early 1970s, food aid was almost always procured from extant 
government food stocks created by domestic farm support programs.  With the decline in farm 
surpluses in the European Union and the United States over the 1990s, impressionistic evidence 
suggests that a significantly increased share of food aid now arises from cash appropriations, 
although hard data on this question does not seem to exist.  The shift may make a difference, 
however, so this question merits research. 
 
30. Donors who are highly motivated by humanitarian concerns may not only be willing t
spend more on food aid, they may appropriate cash for the purchase of food to distribute to 
intended beneficiaries.  Open market procu
d
com rcial suppliers on that market.  This is the core logic behind local purchases and triangula
transactions, the idea that food aid can benefit not only poor consumers in the location where
to be distributed, it can also benefit poor producers elsewhere in the recipient country (in the ca
of local purchases) or in another, nearby low-income country (in the case of triangular 
transactions).  The same logic also motivates many donor country commodity groups to lobby for 
food aid, which they perceive as generating domestic price support effects separate from any 
export promotion benefits that might result. 
 
31. When food aid originates in domestic surplus stocks, food aid does not stimulate demand, 
rather it changes the nature and perhaps the volume of supply.  Food aid supplied out of surplu
stocks permits the donor to undertake price d
p
to aid recipients with a lower willingness to pay (Srinivasan 1989).12 Price discrimination always 
benefits producers since it permits them to capture a greater share of the economic surplus 
generated by exchange.  Suppliers’ capacity to price discriminate successfully depends 
fundamentally on market segmentation so that food aid recipients do not turn around and sell the 
aid on the world market to other buyers.  Hence the UMR restriction on recipients under the FAC.
In fact, for reasons already discussed, leakage almost inevitably occurs in the form of reduc
commercial imports, which should reduce world market prices relative to what they wou
donors could enforce UMRs and thereby accomplish perfect price discrimination between 
commercial customers and food aid recipients. 
 
32. As soon as one recognizes that food aid provided by net exporting countries enables de 
facto price discrimination, it becomes plain that the effects of food aid on world market pric
depends on one’s counterfactual: should one ass
 
12 Put differently, given that food is being given away on highly (in the limit, fully) concessional terms, it is 
akin to dumping. 
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held off the market or that they would otherwise be indistinguishably commingled with the 
mer d 
 
eases 
w 
egate supply 
 recipient economies, are the resulting price effects transmitted to other source or destination 
 for 
d in the 
odities 
 unlikely 
ountervailing effects, 
ndering analytically ambiguous the net effect of food aid on commercial food trade and world 
 ma  
ical 
com cial aggregate supply?  If one conjectures that stocks would otherwise be completely hel
off the market, then the leakage inherent to food aid distribution implies that food aid depresses
market prices, thereby hurting commercial suppliers.  On the other hand, if one believes stocks 
would be marketed commercially if they were not given away as food aid, then food aid incr
world market prices by removing supplies from commercial distribution channels.   
 
33. The extent of international food market integration is the final factor that determines ho
food aid affects commercial suppliers.  If cash procurement of food stimulates commercial 
demand in the source market or if the limited additionality of food aid increases aggr
in
markets internationally and, if so, to what extent and with what speed?  How does food aid in the 
form of one commodity affect market equilibria in markets for other commodities, including
processed products derived from the same commodity (e.g., how does maize distribution affect 
the market for maize flour)?  Economic theory clearly implies that in the absence of any 
associated changes in marketing costs, price changes in one spatial market for a donated 
commodity should be transmitted fully to other spatial markets according to the law of one price 
unless trade restrictions impede spatial arbitrage (Barrett 2001b, Fackler and Goodwin 
forthcoming).  Similarly, economics’ theory of the consumer plainly suggests that food ai
form of one commodity will have general equilibrium effects on the price of others comm
in the same spatial market so long as the cross-price elasticities of supply by local producers and 
the cross-price elasticities of demand by local consumers do not all equal zero, a highly
event.  In sum, food aid shipments should have ripple effects that depend fundamentally on the 
degree to which markets are integrated across space, time and commodities. 
 
34. As this section has made plain, economic theory generates a variety of hypotheses as to 
the effect of food aid on international food trade and the welfare of commercial suppliers in 
recipient, donor and third countries.  Many of these posited influences have c
re
food rket prices.  Some of these hypotheses have been tested empirically, a few of them rather
extensively.  The next section reviews this evidence and identifies the key holes in the empir
literature on the effects of food aid on commercial international food trade. 
 
 
IV. Empirical Evidence on Food Aid and International Food Markets 
 
35. The relevant empirical literature concerns not just the direct relationship between food 
id and trade, but also several related literatures that touch on the questions posed in Section III. 
 blends evidence from 
oth macro and micro scales of analysis.  Perhaps the central conclusion of this section is that the 
 
ure, 
979) and Shaw and Clay (1993) review this literature 
ell, so I do not revisit those older case studies here.  The strength of the case studies lies in their 
attention to details of food aid program design and implementation that affect the market 
a
This section offers a compact, critical review of past studies.  It necessarily
b
extant empirical literature is woefully incomplete with regard to the central questions laid out in
section III, having focused excessively on questions of static income effects related to the 
additionality of food aid and not nearly enough on the other core questions.  Hopefully, the 
OECD’s ensuring research project will address at least some of these holes in the literature and 
thereby make an important contribution.  
 
36. The studies reviewed below employ a mix of empirical methods.  Much of the literat
especially that prior to the 1980s, consisted of in depth case studies of particular countries and 
food aid programs.  Maxwell and Singer (1
w
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outc es of food aid shipments.  However, case study methods suffer well known problems of 
generalizability and of credible determination of causality as distinct from correlation.   
 
37. A second, much smaller subliterature employs statistical methods other then regression 
analysis to try to establish the effects of food aid.  These studies commonly combine descr
statistics with simple, nonparametric tests based explicitly or implicitly on analysis of variance.  
Since food aid and international food markets are plainly both affected by domestic farm
om
iptive 
 policies 
 leading economies, questions of endogeneity bedevil most studies that employ non-regression 
 
de Tyers and 
nderson (1992), Hertel (1997) and Pinstrup-Andersen et al. (1997).  There seems to have been 
tries.  
er key explanatory 
ariables and the dependent variable (typically, commercial imports or domestic food production). 
s to 
on 
 
ade 
priate (used by, for 
xample, Lavy 1990, Barrett et al. 1999, Donovan et al. 1999) because they permit unrestricted 
ati mes 
on 
 
e 
n 
                                                
in
statistical approaches because food aid cannot be taken as an exogenous treatment that generates
observed differences in outcomes.  This method seems generally inadvisable. 
 
38. A more convincing literature relies on parametric modeling following either the 
econometric or programming traditions.  A burgeoning literature on international agricultural 
trade makes extensive use of multi-market or computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling 
techniques based on nonlinear programming methods. Notable examples inclu
A
scant direct use of such models to explore food aid questions, however.  
 
39. Next to case studies, the most common empirical method in the literature has been 
regression analysis using single country time series or cross-sectional data from a set of coun
The earlier studies in this genre used single equation techniques that almost surely suffer from 
significant endogeneity problems inasmuch as aid flows interact with oth
v
Researchers then generally moved to estimation of systems of structural equations as a mean
obviate this problem.  The chief problems with the structural approach are that they typically 
demand more data than are available if precision and consistency are to be achieved in estimati
and that they inherently miss the dynamic issues at play.  These studies are ably reviewed by
Nathan Associates (1990), so that material is not covered in depth here. 
 
40. The most useful empirical studies of food aid rely on dynamic regression analysis 
methods that allow identification of both temporal causality among variables and cross-sectional 
variation and which permit estimation of the time path of food aid’s effects on international tr
and markets. Vector autoregression (VAR) methods are especially appro
e
estim on of the dynamic relationship between food aid flows, trade flows, production volu
and food market prices.  Absent a clear theory as to the appropriate identifying restrictions for 
such a system of simultaneous equations, the VAR approach has much to recommend it.  Of 
particular value are the impulse response functions (IRFs) one can derive from VAR estimati
permit one to trace out the time path of adjustments in the vector of dependent variables to a 
shock in any one of them. 13  Time series methods of testing explicitly for structural breaks could 
also be used to explore an important but thus-far-untested hypothesis, that the effect of food aid
on commercial trade and world market prices has shifted over time. 14  The qualitative evidenc
and the changing foci and modalities of food aid might reasonably lead one to conjecture that 
food aid had, on balance, a negative effect on world food prices and commercial trade flows i
the past, when it was dominated by program flows originating in donor country surplus stocks, 
but that a shift has occurred in the past decade or so such that food aid now boosts and stabilizes 
 
13 See Hamilton (1994) or Enders (1995) for greater detail on VAR estimation methods and impulse 
response functions. 
) 
etrics of structural breaks in detail.  
14  Leon and Soto (1995) provide a nice example applied to world commodity prices.  Hamilton (1994
discusses the econom
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prices by stabilizing market demand through more effective delivery and greater open market 
procurement.  There is no research to date on this question and, partly as a consequence, one g
the impression that much current debate works from dated evidence. 
 
41. One final, important methodological prologue concerns the general failure of empirical 
studies to distinguish between program, project and emergency food aid.  Because program foo
aid dominated the landscape until the past decade and because scholarly interest in food aid fell 
off sharply by the early 1990s, most empirical studies have implicitly
ets 
d 
 focused on program food 
id.  Yet it must be kept in mind that by its nature, program food aid did not target households 
f the 
e 
a
whose poverty would lead them to have a high income elasticity of demand for food.  Because 
program food aid flows to governments are largely monetized by recipient governments at port, 
they merely flow into regular commercial food distribution channels, limiting their additionality.  
Project and emergency food aid flows that are explicitly targeted at food insecure households 
should in theory enjoy higher rates of additionality, although at the macro level this does not 
seem to have been of PL 480 shipments, the only food aid program where one can readily 
compare program and emergency flows (Barrett 2001a).  This is likely due to the fact that the 
United States Congress has imposed monetization requirements on Title II PL 480 shipments, and 
many recipient NGOs support or encourage monetization of a majority of the food aid they 
receive because it permits them to raise funds for non-food development and relief activities.  
Unfortunately, this recreates some of the problems of program food aid and undoes some o
benefits of emergency food aid.   This said, it would be useful to study more specifically the 
effects of emergency and project food aid distribution (i.e., WFP and Title II PL 480 flows) as 
these now comprise the overwhelming majority of food aid flows globally. 
 
42. With these methodological preliminaries out of the way, let us now turn to examining th
empirical evidence on each of the key issues enumerated in section III. 
 
(i) Evidence on additionality and targeting 
 
43. The most extensively researched issue to date in the empirical literature concerns the 
additionality of food aid.  As one would expect on the basis of Engel’s Law, the empirical 
vidence suggests overwhelmingly that food aid partly substitutes for commercial food imports 
 foreign exchange transfer, generally on the order of 
0-70% of the value of the food aid delivered  (Abbott and McCarthy 1982, von Braun and 
s 
e, 
 
nce  
f 
ate 
ough 
income transfer to the poor), commercial imports increase.  
e
contemporaneously, thereby providing a net
4
Huddleston 1988, Fitzpatrick and Storey 1989, Nathan Associates 1990, Saran and Konandrea
1991, Clay et al. 1996, Barrett et al. 1999).  Put differently, food aid seems to be, on averag
only 30-60 percent additional. So the macroeconomic marginal propensity to consume food out of 
food aid transfers is roughly in line with the microeconometric evidence on consumer demand for
food (Strauss and Thomas 1995). One conclusion that comes through in the case study evide
(e.g., Isenman and Singer 1977, Stevens 1979, Farzin 1991, Shaw and Clay 1992) is that the 
additionality of food aid depends to a considerable degree on the design and implementation o
the program, variables that are difficult to quantify and capture in more formal, quantitative 
analyses.  One of the key features, according to Herrmann et al (1992) is the use to which 
recipient country governments put counterpart funds generated by monetization of the shipment, 
in particular, whether these are spent on subsidizing demand or supply. They specify and estim
a cereals import demand model for five countries (Peru, Botswana, Egypt, Sudan and Morocco) 
using 1971-87 data, and conclude that when counterpart funds are used to stimulate food 
production, commercial imports decrease and when they are used to subsidize demand (thr
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44. As discussed in section III, the extent of food aid’s additionality depends fundamentally 
on how well targeted it is, which is the likely mechanism through which food aid program design 
and implementation affects additionality.  It is very difficult to target effectively, as an extensive 
microeconomic literature on transfers discusses.15 Even reasonably well-executed transfer
programs incur significant errors of inclusion (of unintended beneficiaries) and errors of 
exclusion (of intended beneficiaries).  Especially where mea
 
ns-based screening of prospective 
eneficiaries proves administratively infeasible – as is true in most low-income countries – then 
 
 
rrett 
undle of commodities, and then to a 
ubpopulation within the recipient country through a FAP vehicle (Barrett forthcoming).  More 
 
hich 
 
 
6) emphasize in particular that if food aid shipments are unstable and large 
lative to demand, market prices may become unstable since prices are then determined by the 
8. First, much food aid – especially program food aid – suffers extraordinarily long lags 
s in 
 
pments 
 
f food aid deliveries.  Ultimately, however, these situations are subject to political determinants 
that can disrupt deliveries to even long-anticipated emergencies in places where food aid 
                                                
b
intra-community heterogeneity and factor market failures tend to generate significant errors of 
inclusion even in self-targeting program designs (Webb and Reardon 1992, Clay et al. 1999, 
Barrett and Clay 2001, Jayne et al. 2001, Barrett et al. forthcoming, Jayne et al. forthcoming).  
The result is displacement of market food purchases. 
 
45. The macro level evidence generally corroborates the micro level evidence.  Quite a few
studies have found at best weak relationships between various indicators of nonconcessional food
availability in recipient countries and the food aid volumes they receive (Ruttan 1993, Ruttan 
1995, Ball and Johnson 1996, Clay et al. 1996, Gabbert and Weikard 2000, Barrett 2001a, Ba
and Heisey 2001).  One reason is that food aid – especially program food aid – is multiply 
targeted, first to a recipient country with a particular b
s
importantly, however, food aid allocations have traditionally been made largely on the basis of 
political criteria, and there has been only modest movement toward targeting food aid to low-
income, food-deficit countries over the past decade (Ball and Johnson 1996, Clay et al. 1996). 
Moreover, once in the recipient economy, food aid disproportionately facilitates explicit or 
implicit consumer food subsidies (Pinstrup-Andersen 1988, Hoffman et al. 1994), few of w
are well-targeted.  
 
46. Poor targeting, including that due to mistiming of deliveries, often reveals itself through
price adjustments on local food markets. For example, large shipments of food aid to Russia in
the 1990s seem to have caused prices to fall well below ex ante market prices (The Economist, 
1998). Tschirley et al. (1996) and Donovan et al. (1999) each found that large shipments of 
yellow maize to Mozambique caused both white and yellow maize market prices to fall sharply. 
Tschirley et al. (199
re
variable quantity of food aid in the market 
 
47. An oft-overlooked feature of targeting relates to timing.  In theory, food aid could be 
used to stabilize prices and food availability if donors adjust food aid flows in response to 
(positive and negative) shocks to food output, world market prices, and foreign exchange 
availability in recipient countries.  In this way, food aid could provide a countercyclical transfer 
so as to help reduce food insecurity.  In fact, tends to flow procyclically, for multiple reasons.  
 
4
between the time of commitment and delivery.  Clay et al. (1996) report lags of up to two year
flows from the European Union.  PL480 flows seem no better since the United States relies
heavily on domestic procurement of food aid and its flagging restrictions on sea freight shi
commonly induce delays (as well as higher shipment costs).  It is reasonable to believe that 
operational improvements and advances in early warning systems might improve the timeliness
o
 
15 Barrett (forthcoming) summarizes this literature as it applies to food assistance programs such as food aid. 
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distribution operations have become reasonably efficient through considerable practice, as the 
Ethiopia crisis of 2000 clearly showed. 
 
49. Second, because donors budget food aid on a monetary basis, food aid flow volumes 
generally covary negatively with international market prices and donor country food invento
(von Braun and Huddleston 1988, Taylor and Byerlee 1991, Clay et al. 1996, Merbis and Nubé 
2001).16  As a consequence, food aid volumes are far more volatile than are food production or 
trade volumes (Barrett forthcoming).  Available food aid volumes tend to shrink precisely
importing countries most need concessional food flows — when food prices rise — causing bot
food import volumes and food import un
ries 
 when 
h 
it costs to increase.  Program food aid disbursement 
atterns may thereby destabilize food availability and prices in recipient nations.  As a p
consequence, bilateral food aid generally fails to accomplish the objective of stabilizing food 
availability, and thereby food markets, in recipient countries (Barrett 2001a), while multilateral 
food aid is too small in volume to have an appreciable stabilizing effect although it does have a 
statistically significant stabilizing effect on food availability in recipient countries (Barrett and 
Heisey 2001).   
 
 
(ii) Evidence on the distribution of losses due to displaced sales 
 
50. Surprisingly, the literature on additionality generally makes little or no effort to establish
how any lost market sales are distributed across domestic and foreign suppliers, much less 
between foreign suppliers from the donor country and those from third countries.  This is 
surprising becau
 
se it is so central an issue in the international political economy of food aid, with 
od producer groups in this or that country invariably worrying that food aid from some other 
ation is taking away their export markets today, in the future or both.  Similarly, development 
worried that food aid takes 
arkets away from smallholder producers in poor recipient economies.  Indeed, this latter topic 
oint.  
 
e 
 
 
tributed 
 
each foreign supplier group loses an estimated 0.3 kilograms of commercial sales.  So the very 
                                                
fo
n
practitioners and scholars since at least Schultz (1960) have long 
m
has been the focus of perhaps the largest vein within the literature on food aid.  Maxwell and 
Singer (1979) summarize a wealth of evidence through the mid-to-late 1970s on this latter p
Little has changed since then (Barrett forthcoming).  The empirical evidence is strikingly 
inconclusive.  There are plenty of studies finding positive effects of food aid on recipient country 
food production, plenty finding negative effects, and many with mixed results.  This would seem
to reflect, following Mohapatra et al. (1999) countervailing factor and product market effects, th
net result of which depends on a host of country and program specific characteristics.  There 
certainly does not seem to be a mass of empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that food
aid significantly displaces domestically produced food on recipient country markets. Rather, it
seems that on balance, (positive) factor and (negative) product market effects seem to net out.  As 
a result, most of any displacement losses resulting from food aid shipments seem to be dis
among foreign commercial suppliers.  
 
51. Barrett et al. (1999) seems to be the only study that looks at how food aid affects 
recipient country imports from the donor country versus from other countries.  Using VAR 
estimation methods to study the dynamic effect of PL 480 shipments, that study estimates that 
food aid has nearly identical negative effects on contemporaneous commercial imports from the
United States and from the rest of the world.  For each kilogram per capita of food aid received, 
 
16 Because the EU food aid budget is fixed in volume terms rather than expenditure terms, there is no 
discernible correlation between world food prices and EU food aid flow volumes (Clay et al. 1996). 
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limited available empirical evidence suggests that  there are indeed contemporaneous 
displacement effects and that these are distributed roughly equally between donor and other  
reign commercial suppliers, with domestic producers not suffering any systematic loss of 
ly a 
fo
market sales.  Given the importance of these distributional questions, however, this is plain
topic in need of further research. 
 
 
(iii) Evidence on dynamic income effects 
 
52. Claims regarding the dynamic income effects abound in popular discussions o
yet there has been scant research on the topic.  For example, Barrett (1998, p.569) notes that  
“farm lobby advocates commonly argue that food aid promotes 
commercial trade, noting that 43 of the top 50 importers of U.S. 
farm products onc
f food aid, 
e received PL 480 food aid and that the major 
U.S. food aid recipients of the 1950s and 1960s (e.g., India, 
Israel, Italy, Korea, Spain) are now major commercial customers.  
or example, because roughly 90% 
(153) of the world’s economies have at one time received food 
The common cl  thus that while in 
the short-run fo onetheless 
stimulates long-  donor.  However, 
the dynamics of ave received 
almost no schol popular wisdom 
conclusively.  T , finds empirical 
support for this al food trade.  
Perhaps of greatest interest, Barrett et al. (1999) distinguish between recipient country imports 
from the donor xporters.  They find that U.S. program food 
 
 
raints 
ith 
uency 
orking capital constraints bind at the household level and balance of payments 
onstraints bind at the macroeconomic level in low-income countries, there seems good reason to 
t 
 
These are facile claims.  F
aid, it is little surprise that about the same proportion of US 
farmers’ export customers once received food aid.  And the 
longest standing recipients of U.S. food aid (Peru, Haiti, India, 
Indonesia, Jordan, and the Philippines) are relatively small 
markets for U.S. food exporters.”  
aim by agricultural producer groups advocating for food aid is
od aid may significantly substitute for commercial food imports, it n
run demand for commercial food imports, especially from the
 the relationship between food aid and commercial trade flows h
arly attention, so it is impossible to either accept or reject the 
he only paper that explores this question, Barrett et al. (1999)
hypothesis of a J-curve relation between food aid and commerci
(the United States) and from other e
aid primarily stimulates medium-to-long term commercial imports from non.-U.S. producers, 
largely because of considerable persistence in food aid shipments and recipient demand for 
variety (Barrett 1998).  As a consequence, estimated internal rates of return on U.S. program food
aid (PL 480 Titles I and III) shipments were found to be negative at all meaningful horizons.  
This limited evidence suggests that food aid makes for a rather ineffective trade promotion 
instrument. 
 
53. There is some micro-level evidence that food aid can generate the sorts of dynamic income 
gains that would underpin results such as those reported in the preceding paragraph.  In a study 
based on whole farm programming methods, Bezuneh et al. (1988) found that food aid in rural
Kenya increased food production by program participants by relieving working capital const
that encouraged on-farm investment. Mellor (1978), Dearden and Ackroyd (1989), and Dorosh et 
al. (1995) obtain similar results using different methods, while Barrett et al. (2001) come up w
very similar findings using data from the same subpopulation a decade later.  Given the freq
with which w
c
believe the limited empirical evidence suggesting that food aid’s contemporaneous displacemen
of food purchases might foster productive investments that generate significant dynamic income
gains from food aid.  
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(iv) Evidence on differential inter-commodity effects 
 
54. There seems to be little direct empirical evidence on either the question of whether food a
either induces shifts in consumer tastes, thereby inducing substitution of imported foods for 
indigenous ones over time, or the question of whether taste for variety results in differential inter-
commodity effects of food aid shipments.  Delgado and Miller (1995) argue that food aid has 
contributed to shifting
id 
 consumer demand from rice to hard wheat in west Africa.  Merbis and 
Nubé (2001) likewise argue that food aid can be an effective marketing tool, much as corporate 
arketers in other sectors will commonly distribute free samples so as to build up brand identity.  
pirical methods, so the extent to 
hich such effects truly exist remains quite unclear.  
n 
rt 
ts 
ice distributions of several food 
ommodities. There are certainly plenty of anecdotes about relating how food aid beneficiaries 
 
m
These claims are not, however, based on particularly rigorous em
w
 
55. Barrett et al. (1999) invoke the argument about consumer taste for variety to try to explai
their finding that PL480 food aid shipments stimulate lagged recipient country demand for food 
exports from countries other than the United States.  But they offer no direct evidence in suppo
of this claim.  Donovan et al. (1999) likewise indirectly invoke the issue in discussing the effec
of yellow maize food aid distribution on white maize markets in Mozambique. Barrett (1997) 
similarly discusses the effects of releases from Madagascar’s rice buffer stock facility – which 
was partly supplied through food aid shipments and which functions like program food aid in 
releasing surplus stocks onto local markets – on the pr
c
receiving a sack of wheat or corn-soy-blend will happily trade much of it for meat and alcohol 
But there is scant rigorous empirical evidence on the cross-commodity effects of food aid and any
associated international differences.17 
 
 
(v) Donor behavior and the effects of food aid sourcing 
 
53. Gilbert derived a formal model of demand for food aid by the United States go
which he used to specify an econometric model for estimating the effects of expected reductions
in publicly held cereal stocks on food aid flows.  In econometric studies, Shapouri and Missiaen
(1990) found that wheat prices and government held commodity stocks were the primary 
determinants of aggregate food aid 
vernment, 
 
 
s from Canada, the EC and the United States. Taylor and 
yerlee (1991) and Ruttan (1993) obtained qualitatively similar results in related econometric 
tudies.   Saran and Konandreas (1991) similarly emphasize the opportunity cost of food aid as 
cks.  Based on such research, higher 
orld food prices and lower government surplus stocks post-URAA were expected to lead to 
, 
                                                
flow
B
s
dependent on world market prices and extant surplus sto
w
decreased food aid flows.  There has indeed been some reduction in food aid flows (Figure 1), yet 
the recovery in food aid flows over the past three years also underscores changes in the nature of 
procurement.   
 
54. There do not appear to be any studies to date on the potentially differential trade effects 
of different food aid procurement modalities.  Shaw and Clay (1993) cite a USDA study of the 
effect of United States food aid shipments of wheat on prices prevailing in the American market
1986-89, and, derivatively, on the producer surplus of United States wheat growers.  But this 
 
17 One might imagine that coarse grains shipments could, for example, depress market demand for coarse 
grains in the recipient economy but stimulate demand for animal products, sugar and vegetable oils. 
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study, a copy of which could not be tracked down for this review, does not appear to have 
controlled for different procurement methods and much has changed in the intervening 15 years. 
 
55. One major obstacle to such research is data availability. Only 11 percent of global food 
ult 
 the 
xample, in the United States, the Bush Administration is presently pushing to transition food aid 
 fr
t 
ts. 
aid shipments were procured via local purchases or triangular transactions.  Figures are not 
available on the share of the remainder that was purchased by donors rather than donated from 
their existing stocks (or from purchases to which they were otherwise committed, for example 
due to domestic farm support programs).  Without developing such data series, it will be diffic
to establish either the extent to which food aid actually expands market demand for food or
markets in which this happens. The issue is nonetheless of considerable current importance.  For 
e
away om dependence on surplus stocks under section 416(b) and toward cash appropriations 
under Title II PL 480.  One can well imagine that such changes, if implemented at significan
scale, could have a measurable effect on United States and presumably international food marke
 
 
(vi) Market integration and price transmission  
 
56. This brings us to the final set of issues that condition the effects food aid shipments have 
on international food markets: the degree of spatial market integration and the speed and extent
intermarket price transmission.  If markets are reasonably well integrated, then price shocks 
induced by procurement in source markets or limited additionality in destination markets should 
 of 
ansmit well beyond those local markets.  In this way, food aid may affect international markets.  
urprisingly, there seems to have been no careful empirical research on this question at the 
esent a small – and steadily falling – share of 
lobal food trade (Figure 3), but there may well exist nontrivial marginal effects due to significant 
 
e 
ent in low-income 
ountries may be less than price transmission due to procurement in donor country economies.  
n 
r and 
l. 
d 
t urban port markets such as Maputo seem to be able to absorb food aid 
hipments without incurring large, long-term adverse effects.   
tr
S
international scale.  Granted, food aid flows repr
g
local food aid shocks (such as the massive sudden flows to Russia in 1999). 
 
57.  Most recent studies suggest that world agricultural markets are reasonably well 
integrated and that price shocks in one major market transmit relatively completely and quickly to
spatially distant markets (Leon and Soto 1995, Miljkovic 1999, Barrett 2001b, Fackler and 
Goodwin forthcoming).  Increasingly open markets in the wake of the URAA and prospectiv
further liberalization through the WTO and regional agreements should reinforce this pattern.  
Nonetheless, low-income country markets tend not to be as well integrated with global markets 
(Barrett 1997), so price transmission of shocks due to deliveries or procurem
c
Understanding such patterns is essential to mapping out the spillover effects of food aid o
commercial producers around the world.  There have been considerable recent advances in spatial 
price analysis methods which could facilitate such work (Barrett and Li forthcoming, Fackle
Goodwin forthcoming).  
 
58. There has been at least one careful study of price transmission questions at the local leve
Applying VAR methods to estimate impulse response functions out of weekly time series on foo
aid deliveries and local market prices, Donovan et al. (1999) found that deliveries of yellow 
maize food aid to Mozambique depress yellow maize prices in the Maputo market, with the 
effects dampening out after eight to ten weeks.  Qualitatively similar, but more muted effects 
were transmitted to the white maize market, corroborating the inter-commodity spillover 
hypothesis and that at leas
s
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V. Summary and Future Research Directions 
 
59.  If food aid could be perfectly additional, there would be no trade distortions.  Econom
theory offers the clear prediction that income transfers in the form of food will not prove w
additional in the short-term because food is a normal good characterized by relatively low income 
elasticity of demand among all but the poorest subpopulations i
ic 
holly 
n the world.  The salient question 
en becomes how reduced contemporaneous commercial sales of food are distributed across 
rnate suppliers (domestic producers in recipient economies, exporters in donor countries, and 
oping countries).  The empirical evidence 
uggests that the bulk of contemporaneous displacement of commercial food sales is suffered by 
 
t 
can yet be reached.  Nor has there been significant empirical research to date on 
uestions of induced change in consumer tastes, the differential inter-commodity effects that 
h on 
 
ver 
 
 aid has 
dly in relation to commercial trade flows, limiting its capacity to affect global 
markets appreciably. Whatever spillover effects exist by which food aid distorts trade patterns or 
 
al 
th
alte
exporters in third countries, including other devel
s
exporters to the recipient country market, both exporters from the donor country and from third 
countries.   
 
60. However, this question of contemporaneous additionality is but one of a variety of key 
questions one must address to arrive at an accurate assessment of the impact food aid has on 
international commercial food trade.  The limited evidence available on other key points suggests,
for example, that food aid provides a longer-term stimulus to food import demand in recipien
economies, especially imports from countries other than the donor.  These sorts of dynamic and 
cross-sectional spillover effects have not been widely researched, however, so no firm 
conclusions 
q
might arise due to consumer demand for dietary variety, or the effects of alternative food aid 
procurement methods on source market conditions.  In spite of more than forty years’ researc
food aid and longstanding concerns about the relationship between food aid and commercial trade, 
we remain woefully underinformed about the most basic mechanisms that underpin that 
relationship. 
 
61. In reflecting on that relationship, and on the data and methods through which analysts
might shed light on it, it is important to bear in mind that food aid has changed dramatically o
the years.  Unlike a quarter century ago, food aid today is primarily distributed by multilateral
agencies and PVOs, for humanitarian purposes for which it is better integrated with famine early 
warning systems, and it relies more heavily on cash appropriations than on surplus disposal and 
makes more extensive use of local purchases and triangular transactions.  Moreover, food
shrunk marke
international food market prices, the effects are likely quite modest today.  Moreover, there’s an
inherent tradeoff between increasingly restrictively targeted food aid that will increase errors of 
exclusion among intended beneficiaries, on the one hand, and increased distortion of commerci
food trade patterns, on the other.   
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